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The “Devès Affair” in Saint-Louis-du-Senegal: A Critical Assessment of the Sources, 1902–
1911*

Kalala Ngalamulume
Bryn Mawr College

ABSTRACT This article examines the validity and reliability of the testimonies and sworn depositions that
the Peuvergne administration produced in July 1910 as evidence justifying Justin Devès’s suspension and
removal from office as mayor of Saint-Louis, capital of French Senegal. The main argument here is that
the “Devès Affair” was based on spurious charges. The article places the conflict in the broader context
of the political and economic competition between the French colonial administration and the Bordeaux
firms, on the one hand, and the Devès network, on the other.
RÉSUMÉ Cet article examine la validité et la fiabilité des témoignages et dépositions sous serment que
l’administration Peuvergne produisit en juillet 1910 comme preuve justifiant la suspension et la
destitution de Justin Devès de son poste de maire de Saint-Louis, capitale du Sénégal français. Mon
argument principal ici est que “l’Affaire Devès” était basée sur des accusations fallacieuses. L’article
place le conflit dans un contexte plus large de la compétition politique et économique entre
l’administration coloniale française et les entreprises bordelaises, d’une part, et le réseau de Devès, d’
autre part.

*

Evidence for this study comes from the Archives Nationales du Sénégal (ANS) in Dakar, the

Archives Nationales d’Outre-Mer (ANOM) in Aix-en-Provence (France), and the Bibliothèque
Nationale de France (BNP) in Paris. I thank the Bryn Mawr College Committee on Faculty
Grants and Awards for funding my broader research agenda out of which this article is drawn.
Many thanks are due to Nwando Achebe, founding editor-in-chief of the Journal of West African
History (JWAH), for her encouragement. I also thank the anonymous readers of the JWAH for
their critical comments. Any shortcomings are mine. I owe special thanks to copy editor David
Estrin for his good work correcting my omissions and lapses.

On July 15, 1910, Lieutenant-Governor Jules Peuvergne1 suspended Justin Devès, mayor of
Saint-Louis and one of the leading Creole families in Senegal, from office for a period of three
months. He accused him for having abused his power (through extortion and various schemes),
shown contempt for the colonial authorities (Governors Guy and Peuvergne and GovernorGeneral William Merleau-Ponty), and squandered municipal financial resources.2 By August 2,
Peuvergne had gathered a voluminous dossier that contained forty-six pieces of evidence that he
transmitted to Merleau-Ponty to back up his charges and ask for the mayor’s revocation and
criminal prosecution. A week later, Merleau-Ponty sent the dossier to Minister of Colonies
Georges Trouillot in Paris, justifying his backing of Peuvergne’s request in the name of the
“dignity and prestige of the representative of the Government systematically frustrated by J.
Devès, .. . municipal finances . . ., [and] public morality compromised by this mayor. . . .”3 The
decree of September 21, 1910 removed him from office. On October 7, Merleau-Ponty
promulgated the decree in French West Africa.4
Most studies of the political history of colonial Senegal make passing references to the
“Devès Affair,” or the Peuvergne-Devès conflict, as a closed matter and its evidentiary basis as
unproblematic.5 However, what remain underexamined are questions of the reliability and
validity of some of the pieces of evidence (testimonies and sworn depositions) that Peuvergne
presented in support of his accusations against the popular mayor. Indeed, Peuvergne requested
and received these documents from Dat (administrator in charge of native affairs in Saint-Louis’s
immediate hinterland); Dreyfus (administrator-in-chief and commander, Cercle of Thiès), helped
by interpreter Amadou Séga; and de Copet (administrator of Tivaouane), with the assistance of

Kaïssa (chief, province of Saniokhor), and interpreters Amadou Sarr (secretary of Chief Kaïssa),
and Abdoulaye N’diouga.
In the section of a confidential report to Merleau-Ponty devoted to the events leading up
to the election of Justin Devès as mayor of Saint-Louis and as general councilor in 1909,
Governor Peuvergne took the time to explain the steps he made to collect the evidence
supporting his charges against the mayor. He stated that, in addition to the existing official
correspondence obtained through administrative channels, he had also gathered, in July 1910
alone, new pieces of evidence related to Justin Devès’s wrongdoing that eventually could be
useful for further criminal prosecution. Peuvergne divided the new documents into two main
categories. One category contained the depositions taken down in writing, under oath or
affirmation, before an administration official, in reply to questions asked but “without
influencing in any way the witnesses or discussing with them in any manner susceptible of
disrupting or inciting them to give precisions in one or another sense.” Another category
included written testimony from the interested individuals themselves or on their behalf by
people that they trusted. For example, Cheikh Ibra Fall, a Muslim cleric from Thiès, wrote his
testimony in Arabic and had it translated into French by one of his disciples. Thus, the combined
categories contained a total of twenty-two testimonies (letters) and sworn depositions from
individuals from Thiès, Tivaouane, and Saint-Louis’s immediate hinterland.
This study takes issue with the “new” pieces of evidence gathered in July 1910 and tries
to revisit the case against Mayor Justin Devès. It argues that Governor Peuvergne was
determined to destroy the political career and the economic, social, and ideological power base
of a man who had given him and his predecessors so many headaches. However, realizing that he
could remove the mayor from office but not secure his conviction and punishment for the alleged

wrongdoings, Peuvergne undertook to produce—indeed, to get his administration officials
fabricate—fresh evidence that would stick in criminal prosecution. He was probably inspired by
two files he found in his drawers when he took office in early 1909, which contained the
accusations against Justin Devès—in 1903 by Ahmed Saloum and 1907 by Cheikh Sidia—
concerning alleged questionable activities in Mauritania. Some of the new pieces of evidence
even had the same object, that is, “Justin Devès’s schemes or intrigues.” They consisted of
highly suspect testimonies and sworn depositions based on specific talking points that might
have been circulated in advance for that purpose. The fact that Peuvergne ventured on this
slippery slope (of criminal conspiracy?), a step that none of his predecessors found necessary,
points to a broader issue of domination, accommodation, and contestation underneath the
accusations and counteraccusations.
The article first presents the general context of the Peuvergne-Devès conflict, then
discusses the reliability and validity of the “new” pieces of evidence in the dossier, which the
administration produced in July 1910, and then tries to deconstruct the case against Devès,
<1>The Context</1>
The “Devès Affair” did not take place in the vacuum. In order to understand, one needs to
place it within the general framework of the transformations that had been taking place in the
Senegalo–Mauritanian zone since the 1880s: the end of the old order and the beginning of
colonial rule, with its gradual processes of conquest, consolidation, resistance and
accommodation.6 Indeed, the growth of Saint-Louis in the framework of international commerce
resulted in the emergence of an urban society dominated by the French political and economic
elite; the Métis who dominated the municipal administration since the eighteenth century and the

General Council since its creation and had some economic power; and African elite. The latter
grew as an outcome of the policy of assimilation.
In his study of the relationship between the Métis and the French colonists in Senegal
during the last quarter of nineteenth century, François Manchuelle underlined the fact that the
Métis did not form a monolithic bloc. Rivalries between the Descemet and the Devès clans
negatively affected their ability to achieve some policy goals. Some of these goals included the
restoration of the trade fairs (called the “escales”) held at particular sites on the banks of the
Senegal River, which prevented Governor De Lamothe from reducing the power of the General
Council over the interior of Senegal in the 1880s and 1890s or winning the 1893 election for
deputyship.7
According to historian G. Wesley Johnson, both the French elite and the Métis formed an
oligarchy who dominated the economy and politics in early colonial Senegal. He stated that the
“French merchants from Bordeaux and Marseille led the economic penetration in the interior of
French West Africa; [whereas] the Métis supplied the military chiefs, the bureaucrats, and the
support of a powerful commercial coterie.” He argued that “rivalry, rather than cooperation,
characterized the daily relations between the French and the Métis, and [that] the colonial
oligarchy was only based on a mariage de raison.”8 He made the important point that some of
the new French families who arrived in Senegal in the last quarter of the nineteenth century
“were irritated to see the Métis play such an important role in politics, the administration, and
commerce.”9 This situation led to the maintenance of a social distance between the Frenchmen
and the Métis, the French administrators and merchants having only occasional friendships with
Métis but rarely meeting the Africans in private settings, therefore resulting in increasing
suspicion among them.10

Another important contributing factor Johnson identified was the electoral politics
promoted by the Third Republic in the framework of municipal institutions, the General Council,
and the Chamber of Commerce, which created a harsh competition between not only Métis and
candidates supported by Bordeaux-based firms, but also among the Métis, especially in SaintLouis and Gorée.11 By 1900, two rival families dominated competition among the Métis, that is,
the Carpot family, represented by François Carpot, who was député between 1902 and 1914, and
the Devès family, whose leader was Justin Devès, mayor of Saint-Louis and president of the
General Council. To complicate the matter, there were also jealousies between the Métis of
Saint-Louis and those from the Second Arrondissement (Gorée, Dakar, and Rufisque).12
David Robinson argues that although most of the citizens of Saint-Louis supported the
French colonial rule and its expansion in West Africa, “. . . some of them had a great deal to say
about how, where, and when that extension occurred, and they did have some ability to force
changes. This is why the administrators of Senegal and the federation, beginning with Léon
Clément-Thomas in 1888, worked so assiduously to reduce the powers of the electoral
institutions.”13 The Métis citizens who controlled the electoral institutions were among those
who had a lot to say about the direction of change. This was particularly true for the Devès, who
had vast commercial interests, close ties with African leaders, and “the knowledge, experience
and confidence to defend their kind of regime in the Senegalo–Mauritanian zone.”14
Hilary Jones underlined the fact that “Justin Devès’s electoral victory generated new
surveillance from the administration,” which accused him “of publicly defying their authority
and considered him a threat to the colonial system in his role as mayor.”15
<1>Testimonies and Sworn Depositions: Questions of Reliability and Validity</1>

Referring to the pieces of evidence collected in July 1910 (see Table 1), Peuvergne took
great pains to explain that he had managed to protect the integrity of the testimonies and sworn
depositions by keeping intact the stylistic incorrectness as well as the obscure passages that he
could have easily clarified. He prided himself for “refraining from making grammatical or
literary corrections that could have altered the spontaneity of the depositions and for reproducing
them in their original rigorous form.” He remained convinced that it was the direct reading of the
documents (i.e., in their original form) that helped him form “the conviction and the material
proof of the serious abuses perpetrated by Mr. Justin Devès, using his position as mayor.” In
Peuvergne’s opinion, the documents “spoke for themselves” and simply established “the truth”;
he did not feel the need for additional personal interpretations.16

Table 1. List of Witnesses’ Testimonies (Letters) and Sworn Depositions
Witnesses/Location

Type

Date

Subject

Ahmed
Saloum/Mauritania
Cheikh Sidia/
Mauritania
Yoro
Oury/Tivaouane
Amadou Sega/Thiès
Oumar So/Thiès
Brochet/Thiès
Aug. Blondin/Thiès
Diembo Fall/Thiès
Sheikh Ibra Fall/
Thiès
Sira Dia/Tivaouane
Demba Ba/Tivaouane
Zimmar Fall/
Tivaouane

Letter
Letter

January 21,
1903
April 11, 1907

Letter

June 24, 1910

Justin Devès’s
schemes/intrigues
Justin Devès’s
schemes/intrigues
Not given

Deposition
Deposition
Deposition
Deposition
Deposition
letter

July 9, 1910
July 9, 1910
July 10, 1910
July 10, 1910
July 12, 1910
n.d.

Deposition
Deposition
Deposition

July 16, 1910
July 16, 1910
July 17, 1910

No given
Not given
Not given
Not given
Not given
Justin Devès’s
schemes/intrigues
Not given
Not given
Not given

Piece no. in
the dossier
18
19
21
23
24
26
27
22
25
29
31
30

Justin Devès’s
schemes/intrigues
Justin Devès’s
promises to restore
slavery
Justin Devès’s
schemes/intrigues
Justin Devès’s
schemes/intrigues
Justin Devès’s
schemes/intrigues
Not given
Justin Devès’s
schemes/intrigues

34

July 22, 1910

Not given

33

July 22, 1910
July 22, 1910
July 23, 1910
July 23, 1910

Not given
Not given
Not given
Not given

39
40
41
42

Bodièle Tolèl/Gae

Letter

July 17, 1910

10 notables/Dagana

Letter

July 17, 1910

Chief Magnang
Niang/Gandiolais
Chief Maissa
M’Baye/Saniokhor
Demba Niagna/
Saint-Louis
Late Diop/Tivaouane
N’Diouga M’Boulé/
Tickhmate,
Saniokhor
Biram Coumba Noro/
Tivaouane
Diemba Fall/Thiès
Sanane Tine/ Thiès
Goura Gueye/ Thiès
Baba Lo/Thiès

Letter

July 19, 1910

Letter

July 19, 1910

Letter

July 20, 1910

Deposition
Letter

July 20, 1910
July 20, 1910

Deposition
Deposition
Deposition
Deposition
Deposition

35

36
37
17
32
38

Source: ANFCAOM/3G3/5, pieces 57–59, Summary of the pieces of evidence sent to the
Governor-General of French West Africa, Merleau-Ponty, by Cabinet Chief. Documents
Attached to the Report no. 971 of August 2, 1910.

The quality of Peuvergne’s “new pieces of evidence” leaves a number of questions
unanswered. Let us start with the witnesses. In the description of the ways he went about
collecting the evidence, Peuvergne did not explain how the selection of witnesses took shape and
where and under what circumstances the administration officials wrote down their sworn
depositions or the witnesses produced their testimonies. But the fact that the sworn depositions
were taken and testimonies written down long after the events they described and were produced
in one month alone (July 1910) in three different cities under the supervision of interpreters and
chiefs who were paid agents of the colonial administration increases the historian’s suspicions

about their reliability and validity. It is evidently clear that the witnesses did not tell facts about
Justin Devès’s past behavior, statements, and actions. They were probably reporting stories
centered on talking points circulated in advance by the Peuvergne administration, and they
seemed to have had personal interests in the events they reported on or had ulterior motives for
describing the events as they did.
Now let us turn to the questionnaire used. All the witnesses had to answer the following
two leading questions: a) “During the municipal elections in Saint-Louis, some propaganda
warfare went on in [your city]. Rumors circulated related to the unlimited powers of the new
Mayor, [and] the promises made by him or on his behalf. Do you know something about them?
Can you testify to the precise facts known to you personally?” b) “I gathered that you were
present when some indigenous people gave Justin Devès some money in exchange for certain
services he would render them. Is it correct?”
The framing of the leading questions enabled Governor Peuvergne to develop his theory
of the case against Devès. Although allowing for a longer response, the leading questions also
subtly pointed the witnesses’ answers in a certain direction, that is, to focus on the rumors about
“the unlimited powers of the new mayor and the promises he made” or on eyewitness accounts
of extortion of money. Even if the leading questions were open questions, the succeeding
questions became more restrictive at each step. For example, one follow-up question was “who
spread the rumors about the extent of the new powers of the elected mayor?” Another was even
more specific: “Did Amadou Cissé, a former slave of the Devès family, serve as the newsmonger
of these rumors?” or “Are you aware of similar practices [extortion of money]?”
The testimonies and sworn depositions contain variations of the same message
emphasizing three main points. The first point of the message related to the promises Justin

Devès allegedly made during the races for election to the municipal council, the General
Council, and the deputyship to several individuals about the favors he would make to them,
including the restoration of slavery and the resolution of certain cases before the courts. The
second point concerned the statement showing that, once elected mayor, Justin Devès would
become the “King of Saint-Louis” and would have more powers than Governor Peuvergne or
Governor-General Merleau-Ponty. The third and final point of the message had to do with
instances of the extortion of cows or cash in exchange for favors, especially the appointment of
new chiefs in various territories of Senegal. The fact that the witnesses’ answers to questions
have the same narrative structure is a good indication that either they were fabricators of stories
or, more likely, that they were told what to say in preparation for the testimonies and sworn
depositions.
Moreover, given that in some places the interpreters and even some chiefs who were on
the payroll of the colonial administration supervised the witnesses’ answers, it is not easy to
distinguish between the witnesses’ views and those of the interpreters, who also had their own
agendas. In the case of Amadou Séga in Thiès,17 the star witness and the interpreter were the
same person. In addition to his three-page sworn deposition, he also helped translate other
witnesses’ depositions. In Tivaouane, the majority of the witnesses gave their sworn depositions
in presence of Administrator de Coppet, assisted by Chief Kaïsa M’Baye and his secretary and
interpreter Amadou Sarr, and by interpreter Abdulaye Diouga. In Saint-Louis’s immediate
hinterland, Chief Magnang Niang of Gandiolais submitted his testimony.18 And ten notables
from Dagana signed one testimony.19 How Administrator Dat managed to get a single story from
ten notables is not entirely clear. Was he operating under time pressure or did he not bother to

collect each notable’s version of events simply because he knew it was a formality and the
details did not matter? This is probably the best example of fabrication.
In any case, one can argue that the interpreters were in a position to influence the
witnesses. In addition, the chiefs who offered testimonies had important interests to protect. 20
Thus, the suspect nature of the “new” evidence generated by the Peuvergne administration shows
that the witnesses were not in a good position to observe the events they described. None of them
seem to have been acquainted with Justin Devès. All the evidence suggests that there was a
criminal conspiracy against the popular mayor and general councilor. How did Peuvergne use the
documents he helped produce? How did he build his case against Mayor Justin Devès?
<1>The Case against Mayor Justin Devès</1>
Based on all the testimonies and sworn depositions he had solicited and assembled as
well as additional archival materials, Governor Peuvergne built his case against Mayor Devès
and transmitted the dossier to Merleau-Ponty on August 2, 1910.21 His synthesis contains three
sections: contempt for the Lieutenant-Governor, abusive interference in the “Native Affairs”
policy, and promises of reinstatement of slavery and the slave trade. .
<2>Contempt for the Lieutenant-Governor</2>
Peuvergne began his report with the identification of what he saw as Justin Devès’s
negative character traits before he ran for mayoral elections, including his arrogant attitude,
rough hostility against the administration, and his insulting acts against “almost all the
governors.” He then explained how, after he became mayor of Saint-Louis “without the
intervention of the administration,” Justin Devès used his position as a “new force,” a tool, and a
platform for his anti-administration rhetoric and hostility. Peuvergne also affirmed that the new
mayor prided himself for having “accessed the throne of Saint-Louis,” acquiring an authority that

was “far superior to that of the Lieutenant-Governor [Peuvergne] and of the Governor-General
[Merleau-Ponty],” and becoming “the master of the colony.” He drew the conclusion that with
such a mindset the mayor made it a point that his targets would be aware of his negative
character traits or attitudes, chief among them the fact of his “ignoring the authority of the chief
of the colony” in an “inconsiderate, brutal and uncouth manner.” Peuvergne then mentioned
some specific instances or incidents where Devès’s alleged hostile attitude toward him and
Interim Governor Gaudart clearly expressed itself.
The first incident placed Mayor Justin Devès in opposition to Gaudart, secretary-general
first-class, who became interim lieutenant-governor when Peuvergne was on administrative leave
between July 7 and November 13, 1909. Before describing the incident, Peuvergne made use of a
binary opposition and compared and contrasted the men’s character traits: Devès: arrogant,
authoritarian and violent, and rejecting all forms of control; Gaudart: naturally kind,
conscientious, conciliatory, calm, courteous, reserved, and avoiding conflicts and disagreements
with the members of the elected bodies, in general, and the mayor of Saint-Louis, in particular.
These differences would lead to the likelihood that whatever Interim Governor Gaudart would
propose in the exercise of his functions, especially specific control measures, the mayor would
reject.
The incident occurred during one Municipal Council meeting when, in response to
Gaudart’s “indulgent observations” about the approval of the supplementary budget—including
the hiring of a gardener to look after the coconut trees—Devès engaged in an “inconsiderate
diatribe” on the respective powers of the governors and the mayors. He then persuaded the
councilors to adopt a resolution hostile to Interim Governor Gaudart, who gently reiterated his
remarks both verbally and in writing. In a written response, Devès tried to be conciliatory but

even the “calm and reasonable” members of the Private Council22 reached the conclusion that his
letter contained “insufficient excuses.” One of them, the public prosecutor, warned against any
initiatives that would appear as weakness on the part of the administration and his suggestion
received unanimous support from the members of the Private Council.23
Peuvergne’s objective in including this incident in the dossier was to underline the
continuity in Devès’s hostile attitude toward colonial administration officials, to show that it
preceded his administration, and to avoid reducing the “Devès Affair” to a personal conflict or to
opposition to his administration alone.
The second incident took place after Peuvergne returned to Senegal in November 1909
and resumed his work. He explained that it was a matter of public knowledge that, upon his
return, he tried to avoid giving the mayor any pretext for showing his “bad rapports or acts of
hostility.” Therefore, he dealt with him with as much courtesy and conciliatory attitude as “the
dignity of [his] function” permitted him. However, his “excessive kindness” was no match for
Devès’s “systematic combativeness.” Soon, the tenuous peace gave way to an open conflict over
a project to shut down the Blanchot School and transfer more than 200 students to (a largely
black) Brière de L’Isle School that the mayor wanted to pursue despite objections from
Peuvergne and the head of the Education Service. Peuvergne was furious that Devès even
rejected his suggestion to consult, at least, with the General Committee of Public Education. He
attached two reports addressed to the chief of the Bureau of Education that contained evidence
showing that Mayor “Devès was caught in an obvious offence of lying.”24 Peuvergne also
blamed Devès for misleading the Municipal Council concerning his (governor’s) real intentions
and for accusing him of preparing to abuse his power when he reported the incident to the
Municipal Council, which led the Municipal Council to adopt a measure giving the mayor a free

hand to act concerning the transfer of students. Again, using a binary opposition, Peuvergne
described the “indisputably moderate and conciliatory tone” of his letter to the mayor, warning
him to refrain from implementing the measure in question.25 He contrasted the inoffensive nature
of the suggestion he made to the mayor—which was “unlikely to provoke any irritation”—with
the “inconvenient violence” contained in the mayor’s reply. He reproduced the portion of
Devès’s response that bothered him the most: “It seemed to me that no one could ever have
doubts about my intentions. The smallest suspicion to this effect would hurt my feelings. I would
not accept it.”26 Peuvergne left out what came before that: “. . . I am not one of those [people]
who do not want to take responsibility. I am a man who can defend himself by any means
necessary.”27
Choosing his words carefully, Peuvergne represented himself as a sage and reasonable
man, while depicting the mayor as almost a lunatic. He described his own response as “calm and
dignified,” where any reasonable person—unlike Devès—could find “a lesson of deserved
convenience and a useful warning for the future.” He went on the offensive, articulating what he
believed to be the “Devès doctrine,” that is, in all matters, including education, Devès’s opinion
prevailed over anybody else’s and he always relied on his position as mayor and pretended “to be
in control, the only one in control, above the Governor [Peuvergne] and against him.” Peuvergne
accused Devès of imposing his doctrine on the teachers, to whom he allegedly granted special
allocations to ensure their loyalty. The evidence supporting this view consisted of a request for a
meeting issued by the mayor showing that “the mayor will preside over the council of teachers in
order to discuss all questions concerning the pedagogical organization of the school (emphasis
in the original). Peuvergne felt that he could not let Devès encroach on his (the governor’s)
prerogatives or those of the head of the Education Service, so he had to stop him.28

Another trait Governor Peuvergne found intolerable in the mayor’s behavior was his
tactic of sharing the content of his “rude letters” to him with third parties either before or after
delivering them, while making offensive comments vis-à-vis the authorities. He was especially
worried that the mayor’s slightest actions, hostile attitude, and “excitations” could circulate
among the indigenous people and undermine “the respect for the chief of the colony [LieutenantGovernor] and divert the indigène from the respect he generally professes for the French
authority. . . .” Here again, Peuvergne clearly acknowledged the effectiveness of the
counterhegemonic strategies and propaganda warfare used by Devès and the strength of his
power base or network.
The third incident allegedly provoked by Devès took place during the opening ceremony
of the session of the General Council. According to official protocol, the governor always
attended such opening ceremonies accompanied by the members of the elected bodies (in this
case, the members of the Municipal Council, not the general councilors, who were already
seated), the civil servants, and the military officers present in the city. However, in this instance,
the records indicate that the municipal councilors and Devès boycotted the ceremony, and their
absence triggered a chain reaction leading to the incident discussed here. Their absence was a
retaliation to the omission, made by Governor Peuvergne in a thank-you notice to the residents of
Saint-Louis, published in the Journal Officiel,29 of their presence and that of Theodore Carpot
and some members of the General Council among the officials who welcomed, on May 15, 1910
Governor-General Merleau-Ponty, his wife, and some of his collaborators upon arrival at SaintLouis train station. The thank-you notice also did not mention their presence among the officials
who accompanied the illustrious guests the next day during the boat cruise to the mouth of the
Senegal River. When Devès brought the matter to his attention,30 Peuvergne was on a shaky

ground but he found a good justification of the omission, which he attributed to “an unfortunate
oversight; but only an oversight on the part of a civil servant redactor of the notice that I didn’t
read.” Irritated by Devès’s attitude and having his sincerity questioned, Peuvergne went on the
offensive. “Such an oversight,” he stated, “could have been spontaneously and usefully
corrected by a new insertion in the Journal Officiel that could not have cost anything either to the
loyalty or to the ordinary breadth of vision of the Lieutenant-Governor.” What bothered him the
most was the fact that he was kept in the dark concerning the decision made by Devès and the
municipal councilors not to accompany him to the opening ceremony of the General Council
session. In conclusion, Peuvergne warned Devès that it was impossible “to consider your
decision and your letter differently than a well-thought out affirmation and a formal notification
of your desire to sever all relations with the Governor of the Colony, a desire that had manifested
itself, without foundation, in other circumstances.”31
In his confidential report to the Governor-General Merleau-Ponty, Peuvergne confessed
that the previous notice contained “involuntary omissions” made by the redactor of the notice but
that he did rectify his oversight mistake in the following issue of the Journal Officiel, which
would have satisfied anyone but Devès.32 He remained convinced that Devès had used his
oversight as “a pretext to publicly affirm his victory over the Lieutenant-Governor and to
proclaim that he had led him to capitulate,”33 a move that Peuvergne saw as a provocation that
required hi firm response, dated May 30, 1910.34 He characterized his own response as “calm
and loyal” and contrasted it with the mayor’s “presumptuousness.”
Peuvergne saw the absence of the mayor and the municipal councilors at the ceremony
and Devès’s response to his thank-you notice to city residents as “serious and absolutely
inexcusable . . . facts of impropriety vis-à-vis the chief of the colony.” One possible explanation

for this claim may have to do with the fact that the authorities in Saint-Louis always made an
extensive use of forms of domination that relied heavily on public ceremonies, given their
centrality to the process of production of hegemony. The General Council (1820–48, 1879–
1920), which comprised first sixteen (ten from Saint-Louis and six from Gorée) and later twenty
(ten from Saint-Louis and ten from Gorée) members elected by direct universal suffrage by
French citizens and the originaires, was one of the key institutions in Senegal.35 General
councilors gave their opinions on the budgets and revenues and expenditures accounts of the
colony and its needs. Therefore, its opening ceremonies offered an ideal platform for the
deployment of the discursive practices about French-ness, the “Civilizing Mission,” and empire,
and for the assertion of hegemony. Given that Devès was also an influential member of the
General Council, the general perception was that his absence from such an important ceremony
was an expression of his contempt for Governor Peuvergne and his administration; his absence
sent a strong message that he stood for alternative perspectives and policy choices and for
counterhegemony.
The fourth complaint related to another instance of Devès’s contempt for Governor
Peuvergne, which he allegedly manifested itself during another General Council session,
presided over by the governor and attended by the mayor. Governor Peuvergne complained that,
“during one of the most solemn occasions of the exercise of his functions,” Devès “never
stopped making his presence patently obvious, giving the impression of defying and provoking
the chief of the colony.” The first thing Peuvergne observed was the change in Devès’s seating
behavior and spatial arrangement in the room during the General Council session. Indeed,
instead of seating in the space usually reserved for general councilors, Devès chose to seat in the

space that was reserved for the general public, surrounded by some of his aides, the majority of
whom were former captives of his family, which had been involved in the slave trade.
This piece of evidence presented detailed information about some of the ways in which
Devès manifested his contempt or disregard for Governor Peuvergne. His seating behavior was
one of the most visible expressions of contempt; it clearly signified his rejection of the
governor’s authority and an assertion of his own pride, dominance, and status. Peuvergne did not
elaborate more on what he found defiant and provocative in the mayor’s specific gestures.
However, one can imagine Peuvergne paying a close attention to the mayor’s body language,
movements, and positions (including facial emotion expressions, gaze, pupil dilation and
constriction, and probably showing the sole of his shoes), which would have provoked redness
on Peuvergne’s face and forced him to interrupt his opening speech and his responses to the
questions raised by the general councilors during the debates over the budget with moments of
hesitation, pause, and silence.
Governor Peuvergne also contended that Devès’s real intention was to bring more general
councilors into dissidence, but without success. He prided himself for not only receiving the
General Council’s vote of confidence at the end of the session36 but also during the toast
pronounced by the president of the General Council during the official dinner.37 He also
mentioned having received from the deputy mayor, the first councilor, and several municipal
councilors the assurance that Devès’s views, expressed in his letter to the governor (no. 987) of
May 1910, related to his absence from the opening ceremony of the General Council, did not
represent the opinion of the Municipal Council as a whole.
In Peuvergne’s view, all the “facts” in his confidential report—including the mayor’s
insulting attitudes, acts of provocation, encroachment upon the normal authority of the governor,

abuse of power, and administrative and financial irregularities—would have constituted
sufficient evidence justifying a decision to suspend or remove Devès. Instead, he opted in favor
of allowing an “impartial” mission of investigation led by an inspector of colonies from Paris
who could examine the dossier.
<2>Administrative and Financial Irregularities</2>
The minister of colonies, Georges Trouillot, appointed Inspector of Colonies Fouque to
investigate the allegations of administrative and financial irregularities by Mayor Justin Devès.
Fouque was ending his inspection mission in Dakar and was preparing to return to Paris when he
received an order from Paris to lead a mission of verification to Saint-Louis. On June 13, 1910,
Fouque concluded his investigation and issued his report.38
Fouque’s investigation of Devès’s performance underlined a number of management
problems and a “total disregard” for regulatory stipulations. These included selling undeveloped
municipal land regardless of the official guidelines but only by “pretending to rely on the
deliberation of the Municipal Council of March 27, 1895 that was never approved by the local
authority”; creating unnecessary new positions; giving various types of compensation to the
police personnel under irregular conditions; and illegally hiring teachers for city schools.
Inspector Fouque saw in the illegal hiring practices of teachers and various types of
compensation to the police personnel a way for Devès “to favor his personal politics and remove
the personnel in question from the necessary and regulatory subordination to the chief of the
colony.” In other words, his intended goal was to recruit teachers and police officers into his
network.
The second list of irregularities related to budgetary matters. According to Inspector
Fouque, there were no records expenditures whatsoever; some purchases even exceeded the

financial means available; the mayor allegedly had spent a lot of money on meals, expensive
cookies, and luxurious cigarettes during both rounds of the recent election for the deputy of
Senegal. He also allegedly spent money to reward some municipal councilors for the services
they had no business rendering given their status, and the stipends they received were far
superior to those paid previously for the same service. For example, Inspector Fouque explained
that one former municipal councilor hired as a borough surveyor for the city, received the
excessive salary of 10,000 francs, and convinced the city to buy a car belonging to his wife for
730 francs. The city had also rented in the past the same car for meeting the objectives of the
municipal road services and, in three months, its owner earned over 1,600 francs paid for by the
municipal budget. The mayor also allegedly used municipal funds to pay for the transportation
costs of bringing the municipal councilors who were involved in commerce in the trading posts
on the banks of the Senegal River to Saint-Louis so that they could attend the Municipal Council
meetings. The city also paid for their lodging.
Inspector Fouque had also noticed that Devès was risking running out of funds in the
budget allocated to him under the label of costs of representation for the 1910 fiscal year: by
early July he had already spent 6,700 out of 10,000 francs. He had overspent by 1,283 francs.
What Peuvergne also found perplexing was the fact that on July 12, that is, two days before his
suspension from office, Devès used 100 francs from his costs of representation line item budget
to pay for his trip to Dakar even though the trip was for personal reasons. Peuvergne insisted
that Devès continued to squander municipal funds “when he knew that he would be suspended
from office on 15 July, for I didn’t want to take this measure on the eve of the national holiday to
avoid any unjust appreciation of an administrative act that was indispensable.”

Peuvergne explained that the mayor’s apparent lack of fiscal discipline had to do with his
refusal to follow the rules governing municipal expenses, which consisted of seeking prior
approval of the governor before engaging a planned expense. Again, using a binary opposition
approach, Peuvergne underlined the fact that previous mayors of Saint-Louis as well as the
mayors of other communes (Gorée, Dakar, and Rufisque) had always followed these regulations.
However, in his view, Devès had none of the qualities of a good mayor, which involved being
“more inclined to follow the financial regulations, more deferential and more open to advices, to
indications based on the prevailing texts issued by the local administration.” Peuvergne came
across as a generous leader, slow to anger who, instead of suspending the mayor on the eve of
the national holiday celebration (July 14) and provoking an “unjust appreciation of an
indispensable administrative notice,” postponed his decision and waited for the right moment in
order “to put an end to a deplorable state of affairs.” Let us turn now to the third and last part of
Peuvergne’s report on Devès.
<2>Abusive Interference in Native Affairs Policy</2>
Peuvergne saw these grievances as “the most absolute evidence” he needed to back up his
charges against Devès in order to avoid giving the impression that the conflict opposing the two
men was strictly personal. To be credible, therefore, Peuvergne had to show continuity in
Devès’s behavior, starting with the period before the governor’s tenure. He commented on this in
three documents.
The first document Peuvergne presented related to Devès’s interference in the internal
affairs of Mauritanian polities was official correspondence from former Governor-General Noel
Eugène Ballay (November 1900–January 1902) to the minister of colonies, dated March 7, 1902.
Ballay’s letter dealt with events that took place in the context of a power struggle in the Trarza

region between two candidates to the Emirate: Ahmed Saloum and his cousin and rival Ould Sidi
Mohamed Fall. Ahmed Saloum had the support of the French colonial authorities in Saint-Louis
before whom he had signed a statement that placed the Trarza region under French protectorate.
Ould Sidi could count on his standing as the disciple of Cheikh Sidia, a respected Muslim and
Francophile marabout (cleric), whose influence extended beyond the Trarza region to include the
Brakna, Tagant and part of Adrar regions; popular support in the Trarza region; and the support
of some influential families in Saint-Louis, especially within the business community. But before
Saloum could consolidate his power base—and probably because of the perception that he was
an ally of a “Christian power”39—an important segment of the population in the Trarza region
rejected his claims to be Emir and, instead, pledged their allegiance to Sidi Ould Mahomet Fall,
who declared the jihad (holy war) against the “Christians.” Taken by surprise by the turn of the
events, Ahmed Saloum retreated and found refuge at Dagana, a French post in Senegal. In
response, the colonial administration in Saint-Louis rejected the fait accompli and ordered a
Senegalese chief from the Waloo province to send fifty of his cavalrymen to join the “precarious
forces” of Ahmed Saloum and drive Ould Sidi out of power. The counterattack was successful
and Saint-Louis imposed an illegitimate chief upon the Trarzas. However, by the end of February
1902, Ahmet Saloum’s camp fell to Ould Sidi’s followers and all the chiefs who had pledged
their allegiance to him only few days before defected to Ould Sidi’s forces. The presence of
François Devès in Sidi’s camp, signaled by eyewitness reports, convinced the authorities in
Saint-Louis that he was the instigator of the attack in question. His intended goal was to collect
the “Khafor” or right of way of 25,000 francs per year from the caravans crossing the territory on
the way to French trading posts on the banks of the Senegal River.

Peuvergne quoted a passage from Ballay’s letter in which he explained his Mauritanian
policy, which “consisted in ruining the influence that the Devès brothers exercised over Sidi and
to show the latter that Ahmet Saloum remained under our protection, that we will never abandon
him and that we will never tolerate any foreign interference into the affairs of the Moor tribes.”40
The second document Peuvergne offered to show continuity in the Devès brothers’
hostile attitude toward some of the colonial authorities was a letter from Ahmed Saloum, dated
January 21, 1903, to Xavier Coppolani, ethnographer and colonial official. Coppolani had spent
a great deal of time trying to understand the complex local ethnic and religious realities of the
Moors and had argued for French annexation of the territory that would become Mauritania.
Unfortunately, Peuvergne did not give more details about the evidence contained in Saloum’s
letter. He contented himself to mention that the document in question contained “some of the
Devès brothers’ anti-French maneuvers and of one of its members, Justin, the suspended mayor
of Saint-Louis” (emphasis in original).41
The third and last document in this category was a letter from Colonel MontanéCapdebose, commissar of the government general in Mauritania, forwarding a correspondence
from a Muslim marabout, Sidia ben Mouhamed (Cheikh Sidia) from the Trarza region, dated
April 9, 1907. Cheikh Sidia (Baba) was in favor of the extension of the French domination in
Mauritania and had developed a friendship with Coppolani that was characterized by regular
exchanges of gifts. Written in Arabic and translated in Saint-Louis by interpreter Bou-ElMogdad, his letter dealt with a request he received from an agent of the Devès family in which
they asked him “to discredit the acts of the Government in Mauritania and to commit this
religious Chief, on whom we had founded our action, to take his distances from us” (emphasis in
original). In this letter addressed to “his friend Montane,” Cheikh Sidia stated that during his

visit to Saint-Louis in March and April he had received a visit from a man named Mohamed
Mokhtar Ould Toussi, who identified himself as an emissary of Hyacinthe, brother of Justin and
son of Gaspard Devès, and that Hyacinthe’s message focused on three main points. First, Toussi
warned the Moors about “the perfidies of the French Government” because “very often the good
it does to people is later replaced by evil.” Second, he announced that preparations were under
way to take over Adrar, a place where the Devès clan had economic and commercial interests.
Third, he underlined the fact that the French were responsible for the recent trouble that had
resulted in the displacement of many people among the Moors. Finally, he reminded Cheikh
Sidia that the governor in Saint-Louis “had failed to keep his word given to Moulazc [chief of
the Eleb], and that this fact is likely to prevent men of his rank to come back in the country.”42
According to Cheikh Sidia, that was the second time he heard this message, the first time
being back in 1897 when he met with Hyacinthe Devès in the Trarza region. However, he did not
want to enter into a conflict with members of the most powerful Creole families and he opted for
accommodation. Therefore, in response to Toussi, he confessed that he was a poor man who did
not pay attention to politics; he added that a comprehensive agreement existed between the
leaders of the land and him and that he would enjoy his possessions in the land of the Trarza as
well as in the Adrar only when peace would return.
In relation to Mouzc, Ould Sidi, and their followers, Cheikh Sidia offered important
details. He confessed that it was at his request that the French government presented the Moor
leaders in question with peace proposals several times despite the great damage they had caused
in the country but that they never respected their promises to the government. Concerning
Moulaye, he confirmed that he died of natural causes and that the colonial authorities were not
responsible for his death; they only asked for the payment for the goods he had taken. At the end

of the letter, Cheikh Sidia chose between the French and the Devès network. He put himself on
the French side: “From now on,” he wrote to his “friend” Colonel Montane, “whenever I will
learn something that would be detrimental to the administration, I will let you know.”
This piece of evidence offers insights into the modus operandi of the Devès network in
the Senegalo–Mauritanian zone. It shows that the individuals who formed the nodes of this
network operated according to their own interests and the various (and changing) power
relations, and that Cheikh Sidia, his disciple Ould Sidi as well as Mouzc, Moulaye, and their
followers in Trarza, Brakna, Tagent, and part of Adrar were probably once important nodes of
the Devès network in Mauritania. The evidence also indicates that individuals forming the nodes
of the network could leave the network when it was in their interest to do so. This was the case
for Moulaye, who had left the network and remained in the government camp until he died, as
well as Cheikh Sidia, who abandoned the network and developed a close friendship with
Coppolani.
Turning to the most recent events following Devès’s election to mayor of Saint-Louis,
Peuvergne affirmed that he had collected “a great quantity” of documents that corroborated his
assertions but that he also wanted to leave the prosecutor a free hand for judicial investigation,
just in case it took place. Therefore, he selected the depositions that contained the “precise
declarations” that he quoted in his report. He started with eleven depositions related to “the
advent of Justin Devès to the throne of Saint-Louis and to his greater powers than those of the
Governor of Senegal [Peuvergne] and of the General Government [Merleau-Ponty].”43 He
affirmed that the “rumor” in question circulated “everywhere among the indigenous population.”
He believed Justin Devès, his family, or his agents probably spread the rumor.

Peuvergne’s other grievances related to Devès’s alleged interference in native affairs
policy (politique indigène) and the promises he allegedly made during the electoral campaign to
several individuals about the favors he would make to them once elected mayor. Peuvergne
affirmed that he was in possession of depositions containing “indisputable proof of these
numerous facts.”44 However, he discussed a few depositions as illustrations.
<2>Promises of Reinstatement of Slavery and the Slave Trade</2>
The last grievance Peuvergne had against Devès concerned promises the latter allegedly
made to some of his constituents to reinstate slavery and the slave trade. He based his charge on
seven depositions, including the letter from ten notables from the trading post of Dagana.45 In
Peuvergne’s opinion, the notables’ testimonies established “in a clearer and most affirmative
way Justin Devès’s direct promises on this particular point.” However, he did not quote any
passages from any of these documents.
<2>Peuvergne’s Final Remarks</2>
At the end of his lengthy confidential report to the Merleau-Ponty, Peuvergne believed he
had demonstrated that Devès had managed to systematically denigrate and discredit his authority
as governor of Senegal among the local population. He repeated his charges that the mayor had
committed serious irregularities, abused his power, and wasted municipal funds in his
administrative and financial management of the municipal resources, as uncovered by Inspector
Fouque. Peuvergne also reiterated his claim that Devès had taken advantage of his position to
misrepresent the extent of his power vis-à-vis his (Peuvergne’s) and Governor-General MerleauPonty’s powers in the eyes of the local population, and to interfere with native affairs policy in
the protectorate regions through false promises and the extortion of funds. He described Devès as
“a permanent opponent of the French administration” and concluded that his dismissal was

amply justified and in conformity with the article 86 of the law of April 5, 1884. He warned
Merleau-Ponty that Devès’s resumption of his duties as mayor after his three-month suspension
would have serious repercussions on public opinion and the local population, who would face his
“maneuvers and lies” again. He feared that the public would view such a move as “a proof of the
impotence” of the Government of the Republic against the power that Devès pretended to
possess. Thus, Peuvergne was very pleased when, on September 21, 1910, a ministerial decree
removed Devès as mayor of Saint-Louis.
<2>Justin Devès’s Responses and Initiatives</2>
Justin Devès did not and could not respond to the “rumors” about his “ascension to the
throne of Saint-Louis” because of the secrecy surrounding the production, in July 1910, of the
witnesses’ testimonies and sworn statements and the confidential nature of Peuvergne’s report to
Merleau-Ponty. However, he vigorously defended his decision to close the Blanchot School.46
He also demonstrated that Governor Peuvergne was to blame for the incident that led the
Municipal Council to boycott the opening ceremony of the General Council.47 In addition,
Devès, in his response to Inspector Fouque’s report of his management of the municipal affairs
came across as both combative and dismissive, especially concerning his alleged disregard for
regulatory stipulations, disorder in the communal administration, and squandering of the
municipal financial resources.48. Peuvergne found the mayor’s response to Fouque’s report to be
“ridiculous,” even “insulting,” and the tone “arrogant.” He also found the mayor’s comments
concerning both men (Peuvergne and Fouque) during the investigation, drawn from Demba
Niagna’s testimony,49 as “inexcusable.”50 Peuvergne confessed that what bothered him the most
was not that Devès made comments denigrating French colonial officials’ leadership style but
rather the fact that these comments were made “in the presence of the indigènes by a man whose

power many indigènes believed in.”51 The governor’s main fear was that such comments from a
popular politician could not only undermine his authority and legitimacy but also encourage the
local population to disrespect administration officials. The new details filled an important gap in
Peuvergne’s story, that is, the rationale for the mayor’s contempt for the governor and the
inspector. The local population could interpret mayor’s hostility and his derogatory comments as
a call to rise up against a government seen as incompetent or illegitimate.
On the legal front, Devès traveled to Paris after his removal and hired two legal counsels
for assistance in figuring out his options. Having examined his dossier, his counsels reached the
conclusion that the removal was unwarranted. He successfully made his case before central
administration officials in Paris.
Upon returning to Saint-Louis in January 1911, Devès shared the content of the letter
containing his counsels’ legal opinions of his removal, written on his counsel’s cabinet
letterhead, with his friends and allies. One of them, Théodore Carpot, president of the General
Council, shared his optimism and confided to him that even his removal could be voided if there
were no changes in the personnel at the ministry of colonies in Paris, in which case he would be
able to resume his position as mayor of Saint-Louis. Carpot also alerted him about persistent
rumors that had circulated in Senegal during his absence that the former mayor had sought and
obtained the removal of Peuvergne from Senegal and the removal of François Carpot, deputy of
Senegal in French Parliament, and that more removals would follow in the near future. He urged
the former mayor to deny these rumors, especially among the indigènes, who were the most
credulous.52
By mid-January, aware of a decision to transfer Peuvergne to Guadeloupe, Devès adopted
a strategy of subversion. He reproduced and circulated a letter, dated December 15, 1878, by

which then Governor G. Brière de l’Isle renewed his confidence in Mayor Gaspard Devès
(Justin’s father) by reappointing him (Gaspard) to another three-year term as mayor of SaintLouis. The letter emphasized Gaspard Devès’s “well known devotion to the public service,”
which represented, in the governor’s eyes, “a sure warranty of the care that you will continue to
give to the management of the interests on behalf of which I am making a new appeal to your
patriotism.”53 Justin Devès’s objective in distributing copies of this letter in Saint-Louis’s streets
was to undermine one of Peuvergne’s central claims: that the Devès had always opposed the
colonial administration. His initiative bothered Peuvergne who, fearing that Justin Devès might
be tempted to convince the illiterate urban poor that he was the intended recipient of the letter in
question, brought the matter to the attention of Interim Governor-General Clozel.54
<2>Peuvergne’s Desperate Quest for a Criminal Prosecution</2>
In the meantime, waiting with impatience for an official response from Paris to his
avalanche of telegrams, Peuvergne urged once more the public prosecutor’s office in Saint-Louis
to open a criminal investigation against the former mayor. He described him as an “individual
who has judicial antecedents [but] who would not hesitate to intimidate, suborn and even
sequestrate indigenous witnesses called to testify against him.” He was worried that the lack of
urgent action could “cause damage to the prestige of the French authority.”55 However, MerleauPonty believed that Peuvergne had achieved his goal of removing the mayor but that his
evidence for judicial prosecution was “insufficient.” He did not share Peuvergne’s determination
“to trample on a defeated enemy,” so he advised him to think carefully and calmly, seek the best
advice, and ponder the serious consequences of his initiative before engaging in a dangerous
course of action. His hesitation was justified by the fact that “the facts are old” and that
Peuvergne was preparing to leave the colony anyway.56

<2>Interpretation</2>
The French authorities’ search for hegemony in Senegal faced various challenges at
different times from various social, religious, or political actors. The “Devès Affair” was one of
those instances. Most of the disagreements took place between the elected mayors of Saint-Louis
and the members of the colonial administration, especially the governors and interior directors,
because they were constantly working together.
Justin Devès’s case was not the only one in the records. Some mayors before him also
had conflicts with administration officials. For example, the harsh tone of the correspondence
between Mayor A. de Bourmeister of Saint-Louis and the interior director in August 1886 is a
good example. Indeed, having learned about the departure of Governor Genouille while reading
the circular letter from the interior director, Bourmeister protested “in the most energetic way on
behalf of the [urban] population . . . against the inconvenient way your administration informed
me about . . . Governor Genouille’s departure.” While carefully reading the circular letter, he
fulminated with rage when he noticed that, as “the first magistrate of the city [and] elected by
direct universal suffrage,” he found himself, in order of precedence, “ranked below the president
of the Chamber of Commerce, who emanates from a narrow suffrage.” He then warned, “I am
alerting the department [of colonies in Paris] about the issue. . . .”57
However, no contest was so open and so disturbing than the one engaged in by Mayor
Justin Devès in Saint-Louis. Involving an elected and popular mayor, general councilor, and a
member of one of the leading Creole families in colonial Senegal, such a challenge was
daunting; it created a crisis of legitimacy for the Peuvergne administration and pushed Peuvergne
past his limits. Peuvergne’s response was swift but also a little Machiavellian.

A closer look at the dossier shows that Peuvergne suspended and got Mayor Justin Devès
removed from office based on spurious charges. The Peuvergne administration produced
testimonies and depositions from individuals who apparently had ulterior motives or personal
interest for describing Justin Devès’s past behavior, statements, and actions as they did. These
documents raise serious questions about their reliability, validity, and objectivity. Their narrative
line seems highly suspect. Justin Devès did engage in some administrative and financial
irregularities. Some administration officials who had legitimate disagreements with the mayor
over a number of issues did find his leadership style combative. Misunderstandings,
miscommunications, and individual egos played out in the interaction between municipal and
colonial administration officials. However, the various administrative and financial irregularities
in the dossier did not amount to crimes; and Devès offered an aggressive defense against those
charges. Johnson has shown that candidates for the Municipal Council courted the urban African
voters and their local leaders to whom they offered bags of rice, sugar, and tea.58 However, such
practices could be explained away based on cross-cultural (mis)communication or unproven quid
pro quo. In addition, the charges related to interference in the native affairs policy and promises
to reinstate slavery and the slave trade were most difficult to substantiate. Peuvergne did not
demonstrate by what mechanisms Mayor Devès would have been able to appoint chiefs and to
reinstate slavery in the colony of Senegal.
Is the Justin Devès who emerges from Peuvergne’s correspondence with Merleau-Ponty
and from the witnesses’ testimonies and depositions, who refers to himself as the “King of SaintLouis” and the only “leader of the colony,” who makes fantastic promises to and allegedly
extorts from so many individuals, the “real” and popular mayor and general councilor Justin
Devès? Is his alleged defiance (almost “madness”) a construction by the Peuvergne

administration? These are the questions that come to the historian’s mind when reading these
problematic testimonies and depositions. Therefore, as primary sources, we need to read these
documents with skepticism. However, taken in the context of political and economic
competition, these documents reveal a great deal about the threat Devès and his network posed to
the colonial administration and Bordeaux firms. They also shed light into Peuvergne’s
performance as a decision maker who acted under conditions of uncertainty and had limited
information about how both Devès and Merleau-Ponty would react to his decision to suspend the
first. In consequence, he chose a course of action that would have guaranteed one of the two
desired outcomes, that is, the removal of Devès as mayor, by helping produce highly unreliable
supporting documents. However, Peuvergne failed on his second desired outcome, which
consisted of convincing the general prosecutor and Merleau-Ponty to launch a criminal
investigation against Devès. At the end, the conflict made Peuvergne’s own position vulnerable
and led to the decision, dated January 10, 1911, to transfer him to Guadeloupe, whereas it
emboldened Devès, who traveled to France after his removal and took credit for the transfer
decision.
Peuvergne traveled from Senegal to Guadeloupe with the conviction that Justin Devès,
“the unscrupulous agitator” who had “raised the question of [skin] color” unknown in Senegal,59
“the con artist,” had escaped the charges of extortion of funds and fraud, and got away with his
“anti-European sentiments.”60 He left behind intact “the legend that there is in Senegal a man
who can defy the Law and the Government of the Republic.”61 Devès would be reelected mayor
of Saint-Louis a year later. In 1913, he would defeat Theodore Carpot and become the president
of the General Council. However, following his death on June 22, 1916,62 the colonial authorities
took their revenge on him by rejecting his supporters’ petition to build, on one of the public

spaces in Saint-Louis (to be named “Justin Devès Square”), a monument in his memory bearing
the following inscription: “The Indigènes Grateful.”63
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